What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? An Explanation and a Defense by Litman, David M.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 3
2015
What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? An
Explanation and a Defense
David M. Litman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
David M. Litman, What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? An Explanation and a Defense, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 823 (2015)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol65/iss3/13
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
823 
What Is the Stray Remarks 
Doctrine? An Explanation  
and a Defense 
“Every person in this room has endured a slight. Every person. 
Somebody has said something that has hurt their feelings or did 
something to them—left them out.”* 
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* Justice Clarence Thomas, Supreme Court of the United States, Speech 
at Palm Beach Atlantic University (Feb. 11, 2014) (partial transcript 
available at Chris Moody, Clarence Thomas: Society Is Overly Sensitive 
About Race, Yahoo! News (Feb. 11, 2014, 2:41 PM), http://news. 
yahoo.com/clarence-thomas-on-race-194104252.html). Justice Thomas’s 
well-timed words provide a great starting point for an analysis of when 
those “slights” are just slights and when they can become evidence of 
illegal employment discrimination. 
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Introduction 
In 1989, the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 1  which dealt with gender stereotyping and mixed-motive 
analyses in employment discrimination law. Soon afterward, Congress 
amended Title VII2 to eliminate a key holding in the opinion dealing 
with evidentiary burdens in mixed-motive analyses.3 While the Price 
Waterhouse opinion had but a brief rule on that end, two sentences 
found in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence have taken a life of their 
own: 
Thus, stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative 
of sexual harassment, cannot justify requiring the employer to 
prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or 
statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this 
regard.4 
These words have resulted in what has been called the “Stray 
Remarks Doctrine.” What this doctrine is, precisely, has been unclear 
for quite some time, but it has come into play repeatedly when courts 
have considered the admissibility or sufficiency of evidence of 
discriminatory remarks in employment discrimination suits, 
particularly in disparate treatment cases. In Price Waterhouse, the 
discussion of stray remarks was in the context of a broader discussion 
of direct evidence and mixed-motive analyses. 5  Since then, the 
doctrine has expanded in terms of the context it appears in, as well as 
the factors that are considered under the doctrine.6 While virtually 
every court takes into consideration the factors alluded to by Justice 
O’Connor, namely whether a decision maker was the speaker and  
1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701–717, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-16 
(2012). 
3. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
4. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judg-
ment) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).  
5. Justice O’Connor, in the same paragraph as the sentences quoted above, 
succinctly summarized her point by stating that a plaintiff must show 
“direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance 
on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision” in a mixed-motive 
case. Id. 
6. See Laina Rose Reinsmith, Note, Proving an Employer’s Intent: Dispar-
ate Treatment Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine after 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 219, 244–50 
(2002) (providing an overview and critique of how lower courts 
expanded the Stray Remarks Doctrine). 
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whether the remark was related to the decision,7 courts also look at 
factors such as temporal proximity and the content of the remark.8 
When the factors align under varying circumstances, courts have 
disregarded evidence of such discriminatory remarks, whether on a 
motion for summary judgment, a motion in limine, or in any other 
circumstance dealing with the sufficiency and admissibility of 
evidence. 
The growth of the Stray Remarks Doctrine in prevalence and 
scope has not come without great confusion and its fair share of  
7. See, e.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven if the remarks are 
relevant for the pretext inquiry, their probativeness is circumscribed 
. . . if they were not related to the employment decision in question or 
were made by nondecisionmakers.”); Del Franco v. N.Y.C. Off-Track 
Betting Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse regarding stray re-
marks); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 
(3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Justice O’Connor from her concurrence in Price 
Waterhouse regarding stray remarks); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 
F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992) (describing remarks as not directly related 
to a decision maker or the decision and thus not sufficiently probative of 
discrimination); Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 
2012) (noting that a test that requires comments be made by a decision 
maker and be related to the decision still applies where the proponent 
seeks to use the remark as direct evidence); Tooson v. Roadway 
Express, Inc., 47 F. App’x 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2002) (in order for stray 
remarks to be considered, they must be made by a decision maker); 
Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Elecs., 82 F.3d 1397, 1403 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“[P]laintiff must show that the remarks ‘were related to the 
employment decision in question.’”); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-
America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that com-
ments by non-decision-makers and those unrelated to the decisional 
process may be properly disregarded); Mondero v. Salt River Project, 
400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005) (agreeing with the lower court that 
comments not related to the decision nor communicated to the decision 
maker are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact); Minshall 
v. McGraw Hill Broad. Co., 323 F.3d 1273, 1287 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that comments not made by a decision maker are not material); 
Standifer v. Sonic-Williams Motors, L.L.C., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215–
16 (N.D. Ala. 2005) (quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price 
Waterhouse and describing stray remarks as those not made by decision 
makers or unrelated to the decision). 
8. See, e.g., McMillan, 140 F.3d at 301 (stating that the probativeness of a 
remark is circumscribed if made temporally remote from the decision); 
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 359 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(stating that a remark made temporally remote from the decision is 
insufficient); Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 405 
(5th Cir. 2001) (reaffirming that a remark must be proximate in time to 
the decision). But see Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 
762 (7th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that comments which are made around 
the time of the decision and are in reference to the decision might not be 
stray at all). 
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criticism from academics9 and even courts.10 Determining which factors 
matter and to what degree they matter can be a challenge, even 
within the circuits, as the law develops. 11  Further complicating 
matters, courts have not always been clear regarding why they 
disregard remarks. Often an opinion will only state that the remark 
meets the factors to be a stray remark but will not elaborate on why 
that label allows the court to disregard the remark. Perhaps as a 
result of this lack of clarity, criticisms have sprung from various 
corners, alleging that the Stray Remarks Doctrine is inappropriate 
because a judge is improperly usurping the role of the jury12  or 
because emerging social science suggests the doctrine may be 
excluding important evidence of discrimination. 13  Certainly courts 
have not always been correct in their exclusion of evidence.14 
 
9. For some particularly interesting critiques of the Stray Remarks 
Doctrine, see Reinsmith, supra note 6, at 246–50; Ann C. McGinley, 
!Viva La Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 
9 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 415, 476–77 (2000); Kerri Lynn Stone, 
Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 149, 174–89 (2012); 
Hon. Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable 
Inferences: A Short, Simple Suggestion for Addressing Some Problems 
at the Intersection of Employment Discrimination and Summary 
Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 749, 760 (2013). 
10. E.g., Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 (D. 
Mass. 2011) (“The expansion of Justice O’Connor’s remarks in her 
concurring opinion is deeply troubling.”). 
11. For example, Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 
1996) created a four-part test that dominated the treatment of 
discriminatory remarks in the Fifth Circuit. Several years later, Russell 
v. McKinney Hospital Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 2000) 
directly challenged the Brown test and changed the approach taken to 
deal with such discriminatory remarks. 
12. E.g., Stone, supra note 9, at 178–83 (“Whereas courts presented with 
stray comments ought to be employing the proper summary judgment 
standard . . . in actuality they often bypass those mandates, and 
substitute their personal judgments for those of reasonable 
factfinders.”). 
13. E.g., Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research 
Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving 
Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. Rev. 83, 86 (2008) (discussing 
psychological research related to “implicit bias” and discrimination and 
arguing that “[d]erogatory comments directed at an individual . . . 
provide substantial insight into how the speaker assesses people”). 
14. See, e.g., Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (describing 
as erroneous the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion requiring modifiers or 
qualifiers in order to make evidence that an African American was 
referred to as “boy” necessary to be probative of bias). 
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The Stray Remarks Doctrine is complicated in its application and 
yet simple to understand once it is put into context. In Part II, a brief 
background of the development of employment discrimination law will 
put into context why the Stray Remarks Doctrine matters and what 
role it plays in cases involving disparate treatment claims. In Part III, 
the factors that make up the doctrine will be analyzed, as well as 
their significance in the development of the doctrine and in proving 
the ultimate question of disparate treatment cases. In Part IV, the 
two common sources of criticism of the doctrine, stemming from the 
social science perspective and from those concerned over the frequent 
use of summary judgment, will be considered and addressed. 
Furthermore, Part IV will explain why courts are correctly disregard-
ing remarks in most circumstances. Finally, Part V will explain 
simply what the doctrine really consists of. This Note argues that 
despite confusion and criticism, courts are, for the most part, 
correctly disregarding evidence of discriminatory remarks by applying 
rules of procedure and evidence. Thus, the Stray Remarks Doctrine is 
simply a name given to the application of rules of sufficiency15 and 
admissibility 16  to discriminatory remarks in disparate treatment 
cases.17 
This Note focuses largely on disparate treatment in Title VII 
cases. Some Age Discrimination in Employment Act18 cases will also 
be discussed, and some cases will involve other theories, such as 
retaliation, harassment, or disparate impact. For purposes of clarity 
and brevity, some distinctions between a disparate treatment theory 
under Title VII and other theories under similar legislation will be set 
aside. Further, although it has been noted that there is a difference 
between discriminatory “intent” and “motive,” this Note assumes that 
when “discriminatory intent” is used, “discriminatory motive” is 
meant.19 
I. Proving Discrimination: A Brief History 
In order to understand why the Stray Remarks Doctrine matters, 
a look through employment discrimination jurisprudence is necessary. 
Title VII, a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, has a purpose “to 
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially 
 
15. See infra Part III.B.1. 
16. See infra Part III.B.2. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
19. This is because “motive” is the language found in the statute. 
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stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”20 
Justice Powell in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green21 expanded upon 
this, stating that “it is abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no 
racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise.”22 To combat such a wide 
range of discrimination, a number of tools have been developed by 
Congress and the courts. Perhaps most well-known are those under a 
“disparate treatment” theory—cases in which the plaintiff seeks to 
show that the employer acted with discriminatory motive in making a 
job-related decision.23 Proving motive is not always necessary; plain-
tiffs may also show how a facially neutral employment practice is 
having adverse effects on a protected group and win a suit under Title 
VII under the “disparate impact” theory.24 Since discriminatory re-
marks are used (typically) to show discriminatory intent, the Stray 
Remarks Doctrine is relevant mostly to the disparate treatment 
theory. A comparison between the purposes of the two theories, 
however, is necessary to understand the Stray Remarks Doctrine and 
so will be explored in Part III.A.1. For purposes of this Note, how-
ever, the focus will largely be on disparate treatment.25  
A.  The Development of the Burden-Shifting Framework 
The modern approach to disparate treatment cases originates, in 
large part, from McDonnell Douglas v. Green, where the Supreme 
Court laid out the process of proving a disparate treatment case and, 
in particular, a three-step burden-shifting analysis. The first step is 
that the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.26 
The elements of a prima facie case vary slightly depending on the 
adverse employment action alleged but generally include (1) plaintiff 
is a member of a protected class, (2) plaintiff is qualified for the 
position, (3) plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) 
 
20. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).  
21. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
22. Id. at 801. 
23. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) 
(one of the seminal cases on disparate treatment theory). 
24. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988); 
see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“But 
Congress directed the thrust of . . . [Title VII of the Civil Rights] Act 
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the moti-
vation.”). 
25. Harassment and hostile environment cases will also be put on the side-
line for purposes of understanding the Stray Remarks Doctrine because 
the purpose of introducing remarks in those cases is substantially dif-
ferent than a classic disparate treatment case. 
26. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
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circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.27 The burden 
at the prima facie stage is not an onerous one and need only be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence.28 The purpose of this stage is to 
“eliminate[] the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
plaintiff’s rejection.”29 Further, it creates “an inference of discrimina-
tion only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are 
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible 
factors.”30 
Once a plaintiff has established her prima facie case, the “burden 
then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.”31 In Texas Depart-
ment of Community Affairs v. Burdine,32 the Supreme Court empha-
sized that the burden that shifts to a defendant at this stage is only 
one of production. The burden of persuasion always remains with the 
plaintiff.33 The defendant, however, still must set forth admissible 
evidence that is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether it discriminated against plaintiff.34 
The final stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis is that once the 
defendant has met her burden of production, the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason is mere pretext for discrimination.35 A plaintiff may prove 
pretext “either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 
reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing 
that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”36 
The plaintiff’s burden here is one of persuasion, though a finding for 
 
27. See, e.g., id. (listing the elements of a prima facie case for racial 
discrimination); Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (“[P]laintiff must prove . . . 
that she applied for an available position for which she was qualified, 
but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of 
unlawful discrimination.”); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
502, 506 (1993) (applying the elements listed in McDonnell Douglas). 
28. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
29. Id. at 253–54. See also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (noting that the McDonnell Douglas elements 
demand that the discrimination was not because of the “two most 
common legitimate reasons”). 
30. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (citing Team-
sters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44). 
31. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
32. 450 U.S. at 254. 
33. Id. at 253. 
34. Id. at 254–55. 
35. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
36. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 
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the plaintiff may be made even if the plaintiff has only made a prima 
facie case and provided some evidence that the employer’s proffered 
reason was false.37  
It still must be emphasized that under Title VII, “an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party 
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice.”38 By adopting such 
an intentional tort, it must be shown “that the actor intend[ed] the 
consequences of an act, not simply the act itself.”39 Simply harboring 
discriminatory thoughts and making an adverse employment action is 
insufficient.40 In other words, “[u]nless it is proved that an employer 
intended to disfavor the plaintiff because of his membership in a 
protected class, a disparate-treatment claim fails.”41 
B. Direct Evidence vs. Indirect Evidence of Discrimination 
In the development of case law on disparate treatment, a divide 
has been created between “direct evidence” and “indirect (or 
circumstantial) evidence.” Understanding this divide helps put the 
Stray Remarks Doctrine into context. Direct evidence is that evidence 
 
37. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). 
This was the subject of much disagreement among the courts prior to 
the ruling in Reeves and continues to be a source of much confusion. See 
Natasha T. Martin, Pretext in Peril, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 313, 396 (2010) 
(“The Supreme Court clearly repudiated the pretext-plus interpretation 
of the pretext standard in its unanimous opinion in Reeves. Yet, nearly 
ten years later, we are still left without a workable definition or 
framework for the pretext assessment . . . .” (footnote omitted)). It 
should also be noted that there is a potential loophole in even this 
statement, as in Justice O’Connor’s opinion, there are situations where 
no rational fact finder could find for a plaintiff, even when a plaintiff 
has made a prima facie case and provided evidence the proffered 
explanation is false. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148; see also Martin, supra note 
37 at 334 (“The Court . . . noted that there may be instances where a 
prima facie case plus pretextual evidence is insufficient to support a 
finding of discrimination.”). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added).  
39. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (quoting 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (stating that the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, having the same “motivating factor” 
language as Title VII, is guided by general tort law in determining 
intent). 
40. Christopher Y. Chen, Rethinking the Direct Evidence Requirement: A 
Suggested Approach in Analyzing Mixed-Motives Discrimination Claims, 
86 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 919 (2001). 
41. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1002 (1988) (em-
phasis added); see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 
U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977).  
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based on personal knowledge or observation that does not require any 
inference, except that it is true, whereas circumstantial evidence 
requires inferences beyond its truth.42 The design of the McDonnell 
Douglas analysis was meant to make it easier for plaintiffs to get to 
court, since direct evidence is hard to come by in employment 
discrimination cases.43 It became apparent to courts, though, that the 
logical corollary to this is that when a plaintiff provides direct evi-
dence of discrimination, the burden-shifting analysis is unnecessary.44 
The categorization of evidence as either direct or indirect thus does 
have significance in an analysis of a disparate treatment claim. It is 
significant for our purposes, as well, since discriminatory remarks can 
fall into both categories. A remark by a decision maker such as “I 
fired you because you are [protected class status]” will almost always 
qualify as direct evidence, rendering the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
unnecessary.45 If you change that comment, however, so that it is 
made by a non-decision-maker (e.g., a supervisor in another depart-
ment) or does not directly relate to the employment decision (e.g., 
“those [protected class status members] are bad at driving” in a job 
not involving driving), then whether the remark qualifies as direct or 
indirect becomes more difficult to determine.46  
There has been substantial confusion in case law regarding what 
is the purpose of the distinction. The Supreme Court attempted to 
clarify this in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,47 where the 
Court stated that “the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where 
 
42. Black’s Law Dictionary 636 (9th ed. 2009). 
43. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985). 
44. See id.; Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1044 (8th Cir. 
2011); see generally Allison Berman, Comment, Proof of Discrimination 
at Summary Judgment: The Eighth Circuit’s Focus on Categories of 
Evidence in Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 53 B.C. L. Rev. Elec. Supp. 
1 (2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol53/iss6/2 (“Direct 
evidence proves discrimination on its face, prompting the court to move 
on to review any asserted affirmative defenses. But, in the absence of 
direct evidence, a plaintiff must unpack the employer’s adverse decision 
to reveal a discriminatory motive.” (footnote omitted)). 
45. See, e.g., Mojica v. El Conquistador Resort & Golden Door Spa, 714 F. 
Supp. 2d 241, 256 (D.P.R. 2010) (finding that, among other remarks, 
comments by two supervisors that plaintiff “would not be promoted 
because he was too old” are direct evidence of discrimination). 
46. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 355–56 
(6th Cir. 1998) (deciding that comments by a vice president that “‘this 
company is being run by white haired old men waiting to retire, and 
this has to change’ and that he does ‘not want any employee over 50 
years old on his staff’” are sufficient circumstantial evidence). 
47. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). 
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the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination,” 48  and in 
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters49 the Court stated that “[t]he 
method suggested in McDonnell Douglas . . . was never intended to 
be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.”50 It thus appears that there is a 
sharp divide between when there is direct evidence and when there is 
only circumstantial evidence for what type of analysis is needed. 
When there is only circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell Douglas 
analysis is not a rigid formula. This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that some courts have held that the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
is not necessary where a plaintiff provides strong circumstantial 
evidence of discriminatory motivation.51  
This all leads to the question of what is meant by “direct” and 
“indirect” evidence. The answer to this question is not fully resolved, 
even within circuits.52 Much of this confusion likely stems from the 
use of Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price Waterhouse by many 
courts to suggest that direct evidence must be provided by a plaintiff 
before mixed-motive instructions are given to juries.53 This interpreta-
tion led to a divide among the circuits regarding what the direct-
evidence requirement was for mixed-motive analyses.54 This divide  
48.  Id. at 121. 
49. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
50. Id. at 577. 
51. E.g., Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1044 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“A plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal 
discrimination motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need 
the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless 
of whether his strong evidence is circumstantial.”). 
52. Compare Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 
2004) (“‘[D]irect’ refers to the causal strength of the proof, not whether 
it is ‘circumstantial’ evidence.”), with Bakhtiari v. Lutz, 507 F.3d 1132, 
1136 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[B]oth words [circumstantial and direct] are 
employed in a purely evidentiary context, and not necessarily in the 
‘causal’ sense discussed . . . in Griffith.”). 
53. Mixed-motive theories are those in which there is evidence to suggest that 
more than one reason contributed to the decision, and a prohibited factor 
may have been among them. The treatment and understanding of mixed-
motive theories has varied enormously across circuits and through time. 
Notably, Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act treat 
mixed-motive theories quite differently in terms of the plaintiff’s 
evidentiary burden. Requirements for direct evidence have been found in 
some circuits and rejected in others. Because of this confusion, this Note 
avoids discussing the role of such remarks in mixed-motive cases, as the 
application of the doctrine is similar, if not identical, but may result in 
misunderstandings of the different evidentiary burdens. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012). 
54. See generally Jennifer R. Gowens, Note, Plaintiffs’ Direct Evidence 
Burden in Mixed-Motive Disparate Treatment Cases: An Analysis in 
light of Costa v. Desert Place, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 149, 151 
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became largely irrelevant with the enactment of the Civil Rights Act 
of 199155 and its interpretation in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,56 
where it became clear that “the statute does not mention, much less 
require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct 
evidence.” 57  Thus, this Note suggests that the divide over what 
amounts to “direct evidence” in a mixed-motive analysis is now moot 
and that the traditional definitions and uses of the terms “direct 
evidence” and “circumstantial evidence” are the only relevant ones. 
As defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, “direct evidence” is “[e]vidence 
that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, 
proves a fact without inference or presumption.”58 “Circumstantial 
evidence,” on the other hand, is “[e]vidence based on inference and 
not on personal knowledge or observation.”59  
While there is some uncertainty as to some of these elements, we 
are left with the following framework. In a disparate treatment case, 
where a plaintiff comes forward with direct evidence, a McDonnell 
Douglas analysis is unnecessary as the plaintiff does not need the 
assistance of a burden-shifting scheme in order to make their case.60 
 
(2003) (“Unfortunately the Court’s plurality opinion and two 
concurrences [in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins] created more problems 
than they solved. . . . Courts and commentators alike have been unable 
to agree on the definition of ‘direct evidence.’”); Steven M. Tindall, 
Note, Do as She Does, Not as She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice 
O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 17 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 332, 336 (1996) (“Because 
Justice O’Connor was unclear as to what she meant by direct evidence, 
however, the federal circuits would approach the question of whether to 
give a mixed-motives jury instruction (in a jury trial) or to shift the 
burden of persuasion to Consolidated (in a bench trial) in different ways 
and reach different conclusions accordingly.”).  
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
56. 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
57. Id. at 98–99. 
58. Black’s Law Dictionary 636 (9th ed. 2009). Of course, this definition 
is not legally binding but serves as a simple example of what is meant 
by the terms. 
59. Id. 
60. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) 
(“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff 
presents direct evidence of discrimination. . . . In this case there is 
direct evidence that the method of transfer available to a disqualified 
captain depends upon his age.” (citations omitted)). In this context, it is 
perhaps helpful to be reminded of the Supreme Court’s explanation of 
why we shift burdens in certain circumstances. “Placing this burden of 
production [to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason] on the 
defendant . . . serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the 
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full 
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Where a plaintiff comes forward with only circumstantial evidence, 
the McDonnell Douglas analysis may come into play but does not 
need to if the strength of the circumstantial evidence is enough.61  
II.  The Stray Remarks Doctrine 
Since its origins in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Price 
Waterhouse, a case about evidentiary requirements in mixed-motive 
cases that was subsequently superseded by statute, 62  the Stray 
Remarks Doctrine has evolved substantially and in a notably 
haphazard fashion. Justice O’Connor wrote that “stray remarks in the 
workplace . . . cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that 
its hiring or promotion decisions were based on legitimate criteria. 
Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decision-
makers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the 
plaintiff’s burden . . . .”63 What seems like a straightforward proposi-
tion has been extended in a number of ways, some of them seemingly 
contradictory.64 This Part looks at what courts have held can make a 
statement a stray remark and what the consequence is for a comment 
deemed a stray remark.  
 
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. 
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981). 
61. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1044 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A 
plaintiff with strong (direct) evidence that illegal discrimination 
motivated the employer’s adverse action does not need the three-part 
McDonnell Douglas analysis to get to the jury, regardless of whether his 
strong evidence is circumstantial. But if the plaintiff lacks evidence that 
clearly points to the presence of an illegal motive, he must avoid 
summary judgment by creating the requisite inference of unlawful 
discrimination through the McDonnell Douglas analysis, including 
sufficient evidence of pretext.”). 
62. Congress amended Title VII to get rid of Price Waterhouse’s holding 
that an employer is not liable if it can prove it would have reached the 
same employment decision even if it did not take the prohibited factor 
into account. Now an employer may still be liable even if there were 
other motivating factors that would have led to the employment action, 
so long as a protected status was still a motivating factor. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m) (2012). 
63. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
64. See Edward T. Ellis, Evidentiary and Discovery Issues in Employment 
Cases, in 1 Current Developments in Employment Law 729, 733–
41 (ALI CLE ed., July 25–27, 2013) (providing an overview of case law 
by circuit on the Stray Remarks Doctrine). 
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A.  What Is a Stray Remark? 
In order to understand what a stray remark is, one must examine 
why such evidence is used in disparate treatment cases. Generally 
speaking, the purpose is to show that the protected status was a 
motivating factor in the employment decision. Stray remarks are 
those comments that, while perhaps discriminatory, do not truly show 
that discrimination was a motivating factor in the relevant employ-
ment decision.65 With that in mind, courts across jurisdictions have 
developed a number of factors deemed significant in determining 
whether comments show discrimination as a motivating factor. These 
factors vary in the weight attached to them and often on which 
factors actually matter. While this has resulted in confusing and often 
seemingly contradictory messages regarding what is a stray remark, 
the labeling of remarks is “an attempt—perhaps by oversimplified 
generalization—to explain that the more remote and oblique the 
remarks are in relation to the employer’s adverse action, the less they 
prove that the action was motivated by discrimination.”66  
While this is, generally speaking, what a stray remark is, it is still 
helpful to review the factors that have been used by courts in 
analyzing such remarks. The most common factors across jurisdictions 
can be found in Cooley v. Carmike Cinemas, Inc.67: 
[W]hether the comments were made by a decision maker or by 
an agent within the scope of his employment; whether they were 
related to the decision-making process; whether they were more 
than merely vague, ambiguous, or isolated remarks; and whether 
they were proximate in time to the act of termination.68 
Each of these factors deserves some individual attention regarding 
their prevalence, use, and significance in disparate treatment analyses. 
1.  Who Made the Remark? 
Many courts, following Justice O’Connor’s express acknowledg-
ment of the factor, recognize that when a comment is made by a non-
decision-maker, it is a stray remark. 69 For example, the Third Circuit  
65. See Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“The relevance of discrimination-related remarks does not depend on 
their offensiveness, but rather on their tendency to show that the 
decision-maker was motivated by assumptions or attitudes relating to 
the protected class.”).  
66. Id. at 115. See also infra Part IV. 
67. 25 F.3d 1325 (6th Cir. 1994). 
68. Id. at 1330 (emphasis added). 
69. See, e.g., McMillan v Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that probativeness of 
a remark is circumscribed if not made by a decision maker); Ostrowski 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? 
836 
has held that “comments by those individuals outside the decision 
making chain are stray remarks, which, standing alone, are 
inadequate to support an inference of discrimination.”70 This is a 
rather strong statement, and it shows that a high degree of 
significance has been attached to this factor, which is perhaps 
stronger than any other factor. After all, intuitively speaking, a 
discriminatory remark made by a non-decision-maker would seem to 
be irrelevant if the question is whether the decision was motivated by 
discrimination. Some courts have even gone so far as to declare that 
“stray remarks, even if made by a decisionmaker, do not constitute 
sufficient evidence [to support] a case of employment discrim-
ination.”71 
Some courts have not seen it as quite that simple, however. For 
example, in the First and Sixth Circuits, statements by non-decision-
makers are not categorically excludable because “such evidence . . . 
tend[s] to add ‘color’ to the employer’s decisionmaking processes and 
to the influences behind the actions taken with respect to the indi-
vidual plaintiff.”72 Further, there is always potential for a “Cat’s Paw 
 
v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that a 
remark is stray when made by someone “not involved in the pertinent 
decision-making process”); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 
983 F.2d 509, 545 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that stray remarks given by 
non-decision-makers are “rarely given great weight”); Brown v. CSC 
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that a remark is 
stray unless it is made by an individual with authority over the 
employment decision); Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 47 F. App’x 
370, 375 (6th Cir. 2002) (deciding that in order to consider stray 
remarks, they must be made by a decision maker); Gorence v. Eagle 
Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating that a 
remark must be made by a decision maker or someone with input into 
the decision to be admissible); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, 
Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1315–16 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that whoever made 
the comment must be involved in the decision, or it is a stray remark); 
Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005); 
EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(stating that a remark must be made by a decision maker to be used as 
evidence of pretext). 
70. Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir. 1997); see 
also Gomez v. Allegheny Health Servs., Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 1085 (3d Cir. 
1995) (“Because Dr. Meister had no supervision over plaintiff . . . [t]he 
evidence before us more properly falls into the category of stray remarks 
by non-decision makers, which are inadequate to support an inference of 
discrimination by the employer.” (citations omitted)). 
71. Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998).  
72. Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir. 1987); see 
also Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th 
Cir. 1998) (“[C]omments of a nondecisionmaker are not categorically ex-
cludable.”); Walden, 126 F.3d at 521 (“[S]tray remarks by non-decision 
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Theory,”73 where there is some evidence that the remark may have 
somehow impacted or influenced the decision maker in making the 
employment decision, in which cases courts are reluctant to label a 
remark as stray.74 The Supreme Court has affirmed the application of 
a Cat’s Paw Theory where discriminatory remarks are made by a 
non-decision-maker in Staub v. Proctor Hospital.75 Thus, there could 
be more scrutiny of this factor and whether the non-decision-maker 
may have had any influence on the ultimate decision. At least one 
opinion has discussed the impact of Staub on the Stray Remarks 
Doctrine, stating that it “suggests that the ‘stray remark’ inquiry 
should be altered in one minor respect to focus on the nexus between 
the allegedly discriminatory remarks and the act that the [non-
decision-maker] as opposed to the ultimate decision maker performed 
which allegedly proximately caused the ultimate employment 
action.”76 Still, a stray remark made by a non-decision-maker and not 
communicated in some form to the ultimate decision maker is likely 
insufficient evidence of intentional discrimination.77  
2.  Relatedness of the Remark to the Decision (Context) 
The relatedness of a remark to the ultimate decision, another 
factor identified by Justice O’Connor in her concurrence, is perhaps 
the most important and yet most difficult to truly define or 
understand. It is worth emphasizing that by “relatedness” most courts 
and this Note mean the nexus between the statement and the actual 
employment decision. In other words, the context of the statement, as 
opposed to the connection between the statement and the particular 
protected status in question, or the content of the remark. It has been 
 
makers may be properly used by litigants as circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination.”). 
73. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990) (“If [the 
decisionmaker] acted as the conduit of [the nondecisionmaker’s] preju-
dice—his cat’s paw—the innocence of the [decisionmakers] would not 
spare the company from liability.”).  
74. See, e.g., Rajaravivarma v. Bd. of Trs. for the Conn. State Univ. Sys., 
862 F. Supp. 2d 127, 152 (D. Conn. 2012) (“[W]ithin a ‘cat’s paw’ case 
the allegedly biased supervisor should be considered a decisionmaker for 
purposes of a ‘stray remark’ analysis.”); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 
572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The remark must . . . be made by a person 
primarily responsible for the adverse employment action or by a person 
with influence or leverage over the formal decisionmaker.”). 
75. 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1188 (2011) (applying traditional tort-law concepts of 
proximate cause to intentional discrimination). 
76. Rajaravivarma, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 153. 
77. See Mondero v. Salt River Project, 400 F.3d 1207, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“Stray remarks not acted upon or communicated to a decision maker 
are insufficient to establish pretext.”). 
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repeatedly held in a number of decisions that a discriminatory remark 
must be related to the employment decision in question.78 In fact, it is 
probably the most consistent factor among the circuits in terms of its 
presence. In its application, however, this factor varies significantly 
across the circuit courts in terms of its consequences, as will be 
explored in the next section.  
One particular area of interest in this factor is that some courts 
have been willing to admit statements that are not necessarily tied to 
the decision, but “could be viewed as evidencing a discriminatory 
attitude.”79 Similarly, sometimes courts will consider the frequency of 
remarks, which could also reflect a discriminatory attitude.80 This 
could be interpreted as courts simply looking at some of the other 
factors and attaching greater weight to those other factors rather than 
letting the context factor get in the way. While the Third and Eighth 
Circuits have held as such, other circuits such as the Fifth,81 Sev-
enth,82 and Ninth83 have been stricter on the relatedness requirement. 
In reaching a similar conclusion, the Tenth Circuit followed such logic 
from Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,84 in which the Supreme Court 
emphasized that in a disparate treatment case, the protected trait 
must actually play a role in the decision-making process.85  
 
78. See, e.g., Bahl v. Royal Indem. Co., 115 F.3d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining remarks cannot defeat summary judgment unless they are 
both proximate in time and are related to the employment decision); 
Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 337–38 (4th Cir. 2004) (discussing the 
fact that the comments were not age-related). 
79. O’Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 433, 436 (E.D. Pa. 
2000); see also Browning v. President Riverboat Casino-Missouri, Inc., 
139 F.3d 631, 634–35 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that a remark, even 
though not directly related to the decision, was reflective of a discrim-
inatory attitude, and thus was not stray).  
80. E.g., Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1039 
(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that evidence of discriminatory remarks was 
not ambiguous by contrasting with another case in which only one 
statement was made, whereas here a number of comments were made).  
81. E.g., Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 
2001). 
82. E.g., Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759 (7th Cir. 2001). 
83. E.g., Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Grp., 892 F.2d 1434, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 
1990); Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999). 
84. 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).  
85. Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1140 (10th Cir. 2000) (“A 
plaintiff must demonstrate a nexus exists between the allegedly discrim-
inatory statement and the company’s termination decision, and there-
fore ‘that age actually played a role in the defendant’s decisionmaking 
process.’” (quoting Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1455 
(10th Cir. 1994)). 
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3.  Is the Comment Vague or Ambiguous? (Content) 
A third factor commonly found in the identification of stray 
remarks is whether the remark is vague or ambiguous—or, in other 
words, “whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as 
discriminatory.”86 This factor can often be overlooked, in part, be-
cause where a comment might mean one of two different things, the 
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the non-movant, which is 
usually the employee.87  
This factor did receive some new attention by the Supreme Court 
in Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,88 where the Court reversed the Eleventh 
Circuit in a case in which a decision maker referred to two African 
American employees as “boy” on several occasions. The Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that “‘[w]hile the use of ‘boy’ 
when modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is 
evidence of discriminatory intent, the use of ‘boy’ alone is not 
evidence of discrimination.’”89 In reversing the Eleventh Circuit, the 
Supreme Court wrote the following: 
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be 
evidence of racial animus, it does not follow that the term, 
standing alone, is always benign. The speaker’s meaning may 
depend on various factors including context, inflection, tone of 
voice, local custom, and historical usage. Insofar as the Court of 
Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all 
instances to render the disputed term probative of bias, the 
court’s decision is erroneous.90 
These factors identified in Ash suggest that the Supreme Court wants 
the lower courts to look at allegedly discriminatory remarks more 
carefully to determine if the remarks really are vague or ambiguous. 
Nothing in the Ash opinion, however, suggested that the Stray Re-
marks Doctrine or the content factor is fundamentally flawed. 
 
86. Pronin v. Raffi Custom Photo Lab, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
87. Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (D. Mass. 
2011) (“Whether a given remark is ‘ambiguous’—whether it connotes 
discriminatory animus or it does not—is precisely what a jury should 
resolve.”). But see infra Part III.B.1. 
88. 546 U.S. 454 (2006). 
89. Id. at 456 (quoting Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x. 529, 533 
(11th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 546 U.S. 454 (2006)). 
90. Id. 
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4. Is the Remark Temporally Proximate to the Employment Decision? 
Virtually all courts will look at whether a remark is temporally 
proximate to the adverse employment action.91 It is not uncommon to 
find a case in which a remark is discarded simply because it was made 
too far in the past.92 Typically, this factor has its greatest influence 
when other factors exist but are perhaps more convincing when 
combined with the lack of temporal proximity.93 The length of time 
considered “proximate” varies and can be best described as a case-by-
case analysis. Still, it is interesting to note that despite sharing the 
same logic as the Same-Actor Inference, the length of time generally 
required for a remark to be deemed stray is shorter than that allowed 
for the same-actor inference to be applied, showing an admittedly 
curious disconnect.94 
5. How Many Factors Must Exist? 
A natural question to ask is how many factors are necessary for a 
stray remark to exist and whether any individual factor is accorded 
more weight than others. The question, however, is not the correct 
one to ask. As will be argued below, the Stray Remarks Doctrine is 
not necessarily a four-factor test to determine the admissibility or 
sufficiency of a statement as evidence.95 Rather, these factors are 
common reasons for which courts have decided that a remark is either 
inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence or insufficient to 
raise a question of fact. Thus, this Note would suggest that in looking 
at remarks and determining if they are simply stray remarks, the 
analysis should not be simply how many factors are satisfied but 
rather a qualitative look at the individual factors and consideration of 
them as a whole. Moreover, it would be wise to consider other factors 
 
91. See, e.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998); Pronin, 383 F. Supp. 2d at 
637; Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 359 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 405 (5th Cir. 
2001); Shefferly v. Health Alliance Plan of Mich., 94 F. App’x 275, 285 
(6th Cir. 2004); Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 
(7th Cir. 2001).  
92. See, e.g., Shefferly, 94 F. App’x at 281 (holding that a remark of “flirt 
and drink” made over a year prior to the employment decision was “too 
far removed in time to be probative of disparate treatment”).  
93. See, e.g., Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 545 
(3d Cir. 1992) (stating that remarks made by non-decision-makers or 
unrelated to the decision are rarely given weight, “particularly if they 
were made temporally remote from the date of decision”). 
94. Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 St. 
Louis U. L.J. 111, 150–51 (2011). 
95. See infra Part IV. 
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that may be relevant in determining the admissibility or sufficiency of 
the remarks.  
B. What Is the Significance of a Remark Being Labeled as Stray? 
Beyond just the factors identified by the different circuit courts, 
there is significant variation and, consequently, confusion on what the 
significance is of being labeled a stray remark. Many decisions have 
held that a remark that meets the factors necessary to be a stray 
remark may nonetheless be circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
nation.96 In the Fifth Circuit, a stray remark may nonetheless be 
circumstantial evidence, but only if “the remarks demonstrate (1) 
discriminatory animus (2) on the part of a person that is either 
primarily responsible for the challenged employment action or by a 
person with influence or leverage over the relevant decisionmaker.”97 
In the Third Circuit, on the other hand, a stray remark may be used 
as circumstantial evidence, but when certain factors are met, it will 
rarely be given great evidentiary weight,98 suggesting that the stray 
remark factors impact its sufficiency. In one First Circuit opinion, the 
court stated that “[s]uch factors heighten the remoteness of the 
remarks, arguably to the point at which they are no more probative 
than they are prejudicial.”99 This suggests the factors have conse-
quences for the admissibility of the remark. 
What happens when a stray remark is the only evidence, and 
what happens when there is other evidence? In Alvarez v. Royal 
Atlantic Developers, Inc.,100 the Eleventh Circuit held that a “single 
stray remark ‘Cubans are dumb’ . . . is too weak to raise a genuine 
fact issue.” 101  That opinion is not alone. Courts are, however, 
sometimes wary of simply classifying a remark as stray and then 
 
96. E.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226 (5th Cir. 
2000) (“The remarks at issue in this case are certainly appropriate 
additional circumstantial evidence of age discrimination because their 
content indicates age animus and the speaker . . . was primarily 
responsible for [the plaintiff]’s termination.”).  
97. Acker v. Deboer, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing 
Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 583 (5th Cir. 2003); Sandstad v. CB 
Richard Ellis, 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002); Russell, 235 F.3d at 
225.).  
98. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 (refusing to give much weight to a remark that 
was not temporally proximate). 
99. McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Such factors heighten the remote-
ness of the remarks, arguably to the point at which they are no more 
probative than they are prejudicial.”). 
100. 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010).  
101. Id. at 1268 (emphasis added). 
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disregarding it.102 When there is additional evidence, courts tend to be 
more hesitant in dismissing a remark. One opinion put it this way: 
Although we agree that stray remarks, standing alone, may not 
give rise to an inference of discrimination, such remarks are not 
irrelevant. Rather, such comments are “surely the kind of fact 
which could cause a reasonable trier of fact to raise an eyebrow, 
thus providing additional threads of evidence that are relevant 
to the jury.”103 
Similarly, if there are multiple remarks, those remarks may be seen as 
buttressing one another in supporting an inference of discriminatory 
animus.104 This is not universal. In Greene v. Virgin Islands Water & 
Power Authority, the court dismissed evidence of a “collection of stray 
remarks and unconnected, coincidental circumstances” that did not 
establish a causal nexus.105 Nonetheless, it appears that at least in the 
majority of jurisdictions, a remark that fits the factors identified for 
becoming stray will, at the very least, have limited probative value in 
the eyes of the courts. When the remark is the only evidence of 
discrimination, it will rarely be seen as sufficient to raise an inference 
of discrimination. Where it is found amidst other evidence of discrim-
ination, however, courts are unlikely to totally discount the remarks. 
III. The Critiques of the Stray Remarks Doctrine 
As more and more courts have held stray remarks inadmissible or 
insufficient, a number of common criticisms of the doctrine have 
developed in response to those court decisions. One criticism of the 
Stray Remarks Doctrine is that the doctrine does not comport well 
with social science and how workplace discrimination actually works. 
Another common criticism is that judges have been too eager to usurp 
the role of the jury by making improper determinations regarding 
questions of fact related to discriminatory remarks. Each of these 
criticisms make fair points but also fail to truly understand the role of  
102. E.g., Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115–16 (2d Cir. 
2007).  
103. Fisher v. Pharmacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922–23 (8th Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted) (quoting Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 610 
(8th Cir. 1997)).  
104. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 
1998) (“[W]hen assessing the relevancy of an allegedly biased remark 
where the plaintiff presents evidence of multiple discriminatory remarks 
or other evidence of pretext, we do not view each discriminatory remark 
in isolation, but are mindful that the remarks buttress one another as 
well as any other pretextual evidence supporting an inference of 
discriminatory animus.”).  
105. 557 F. App’x 189, 196 (3d Cir. filed 2014). 
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the Stray Remarks Doctrine in disparate treatment cases. While there 
are, undeniably, cases in which these criticisms are justified, there are 
even more cases in which the judges were likely employing correct 
logic in ruling that a remark is insufficient or inadmissible. As a 
whole, this Note proposes that the operation of the Stray Remarks 
Doctrine has been true to sufficiency and admissibility requirements. 
Simply because courts have not always been clear and, at times, have 
been confusing or contradictory does not mean that the logic behind 
the doctrine is incorrect.  
A. The Social Science Critique 
As argued by one scholar, “the doctrine and its premises fail to 
comport with even a basic understanding of social science and how 
people foment, act upon, and reveal discriminatory bias.”106 Many 
critics have attacked the use of the doctrine on the grounds that 
excluding allegedly discriminatory remarks because, for example, they 
are not related to the employment action leaves out evidence showing 
a discriminatory environment or leaves out evidence of an “implicit 
bias” among relevant decision makers (or non-decision-makers with 
influence over the ultimate decision). By not recognizing that implicit 
biases and “subtle discrimination” affect the same concerns as “old-
fashioned” discrimination, it is argued that employment discrimi-
nation law is not achieving its own purpose to remove the protected 
factors from employment considerations.107 Further, some critics argue 
that “decisionmakers have become quite sophisticated in masking 
their discriminatory intent,” and thus we need to look beyond 
traditional forms of evidence of discrimination.108 These concerns are 
misplaced. The social science critique misunderstands the role of stray 
remarks and disparate treatment theory and the motive part of the 
 
106. Stone, supra note 9, at 152. 
107. See Bodensteiner, supra note 13, at 99 (“Recent psychological research 
demonstrates that limiting unlawful discrimination to the ‘old-fashioned’ 
type ignores how discrimination actually works in many situations and 
leaves much discrimination untouched.”). 
108. Id. at 96. The argument that employers have become clever at hiding 
their discriminatory intent seems to be made by those who also argue 
that we must combat unconscious discrimination. The former argument 
seems to be an unfounded assumption designed to suggest employers are 
inherently bigoted and that we must heavily scrutinize them to catch 
their bigotry. The latter argument then attempts to bolster the 
argument that all employers are bigoted even when they are unaware of 
their own bigotry. These two arguments, individually and collectively, 
are concerning in the way they flip the American ideal of “innocent until 
proven guilty” by automatically labeling the employers as 
discriminatory before any relevant evidence is found. In other words, 
proponents are saying, “We know you did it; we’ll just figure out how 
later.” 
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equation. The judge-focused critique simply applies common issues 
relating to the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence to the hand-
ling of such cases.  
1.  Disparate Impact Covers Subtle Discrimination and Implicit Biases 
Employment discrimination law is not blind to subtle forms of 
discrimination. As far back as McDonnell Douglas, it was recognized 
that “Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or 
otherwise.”109 Courts have gone beyond just paying lip-service to this 
idea, too. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 110  the Supreme Court 
recognized what has become known as “disparate impact theory,” 
whereby an employer can still be liable for employment discrim-
ination, even with “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent.”111 
Assuming the validity of the implicit-bias argument, which will be 
discussed below, the “primary concern of legal scholars is that the 
law’s requirement of proof of an intentional mental state as a cause of 
discrimination . . . fails to capture many instances of discrimination 
caused by automatic stereotyping processes and in-group prefer-
ences.”112 Disparate impact theory provides a mechanism for address-
ing such “discrimination” if indeed it is there. Where implicit bias 
would seem to come most into play is where there are subjective 
hiring processes and “in-group preferences,” and such subjective hiring 
processes can lead to liability under disparate impact.113 Thus, there is 
a tool by which plaintiffs can seek justice because an adverse employ-
ment action was the result of a prohibited factor.  
Beyond disparate impact, the soundness of using subtle or im-
plicit biases as a source of liability becomes dubious. After all, Title 
VII and similar legislation is not meant to “prohibit discriminatory 
attitudes or prejudicial thoughts themselves.”114 Simply showing that 
implicit bias exists is insufficient to lead to liability where there is no 
evidence that the implicit bias actually had a role in the adverse 
 
109. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (emphasis 
added). 
110. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
111. Id. at 432. 
112. Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the 
Perils of Mindreading, 67 Ohio St. L.J. 1023, 1052–53 (2006). 
113. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988) 
(“[S]ubjective or discretionary employment practices may be analyzed 
under the disparate impact approach in appropriate cases.”); see also 
EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (analyz-
ing under disparate impact theory, but ultimately rejecting, a plaintiff’s 
allegation that subjective hiring criteria harmed women in the hiring 
process). 
114. Chen, supra note 40, at 919.  
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employment action. Otherwise, virtually any employment decision 
could be subject to liability. After all, “most, if not all, of us are 
implicit bigots most, if not all, of the time.”115  A “conservative” 
estimate shows that approximately “ninety percent of Americans . . . 
mentally associate negative concepts with the social group ‘elderly’ 
. . . [and] [s]eventy-five percent of Whites (and fifty percent of 
Blacks) show anti-Black bias.”116 Addressing subtle discrimination and 
implicit biases is thus more appropriate for a disparate impact 
analysis, unless there is further evidence that the employer acted on a 
part of their discrimination or bias. It is questionable whether 
measures of implicit bias really even measure anything useful or 
relevant to such an analysis, however. 
2.  Implicit Bias Does Not Show a Discriminatory Motive 
As suggested by one scholar, “where the operative discrimination 
that engenders a finding that something befell a plaintiff ‘because of’ 
her protected class status may be subconscious or unconscious 
discrimination, and the utterance of a comment in another context 
lends credence to the theory that the decision maker’s bias carried 
over[,]” the comment should be relevant as a link between the adverse 
action and a discriminatory motivation.117 However, this is not as 
straightforward as it may appear. Bias that operates beyond conscious 
awareness cannot evidence discriminatory motive or, more simply, 
that the actor intended the consequences. Implicit bias has been most 
commonly measured by the Implicit Associational Test (IAT).118 Stu-
dies regarding implicit bias and the IAT suffer from some serious 
deficiencies, however. For one, “IAT scores remain meaningless until 
empirical studies link specific ranges of scores to specific acts that 
objectively (or consensually) represent discrimination.”119 Beyond the 
meaning of the IAT scores being unclear, the results have shown only 
a modest correlation at best but have been victim of high failure rates 
of anywhere between 60 and 90 percent. 120  Gregory Mitchell and 
Philip E. Tetlock perhaps put the problem best, pointing out that 
“the fact that IAT scores have low positive correlations with behavior 
expansively defined as discriminatory guarantees that many indivi-
 
115. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 112, at 1024.  
116. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1063, 1072 (2006).  
117. Stone, supra note 9, at 188.  
118. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 112, at 1025. 
119. Id. at 1032. 
120. Id. at 1100–01. 
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duals labeled prejudiced by the IAT will not exhibit the behavior in 
question.”121 Even more concerning is this: 
There is strong evidence that psychological processes aside from 
out-group hostility can artificially inflate and otherwise distort 
scores on implicit measures such as the IAT. These alternative 
processes include the power of stimulus familiarity/unfamiliarity 
to facilitate/impede reaction time, the power of compassion to 
increase the accessibility of negatively-charged cognitions, the 
power of widely known but not personally accepted cultural 
stereotypes to influence the accessibility of associations, the 
power of objective correlations between group membership and 
socio-economic outcomes to influence the accessibility of assoc-
iations, and the power of individual differences in cognitive flex-
ibility to influence reaction time in response to shifting instruct-
ions such as those employed with the IAT.122 
Again, there are questions regarding whether implicit bias actually 
can be correlated to significant discriminatory actions. Many studies 
simply connect IAT scores with observed behaviors such as friendli-
ness, comfort level, eye contact, body posture, and other body 
language indicators.123 To have any real legal meaning, it must be 
assumed (or preferably shown) that this extends to more significant 
discriminatory behavior and that the behavior would not change from 
“stranger-stranger interactions employed in most social-psychological 
experiments on discrimination” to the types of interactions that would 
be found in most employment discrimination situations.124 
The fact remains that in disparate treatment cases there is still a 
requirement that a discriminatory motive or intent be behind the 
employment decision.125 Yet these “biases are ‘cognitive rather than 
 
121. Id. at 1100. 
122. Id. at 1072 (footnote omitted). 
123. E.g., Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Liebold, Relations Among the Impli-
cit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, and Explicit Measures of 
Racial Attitudes, 37 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 435 (2001).  
124. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 112, at 1067–68. 
125. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) 
(stating that plaintiff has “the ultimate burden of persuading the court 
that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination”); Watson v. 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (“[T]he plaintiff is 
required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or mo-
tive.”). But see Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good 
Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Work-
place Discrimination, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1893, 1922 (2009) (providing a 
well-reasoned argument that “intent” in the context of Title VII 
litigation does not necessarily mean the employer must have a deliberate 
or conscious discriminatory purpose). 
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motivational,’ [and] they ‘operate absent intent to favor or disfavor 
members of a particular social group.’”126 Regardless of the soundness 
of the theories and the results that those theories should have on how 
we address discrimination in the workplace, current law requires 
plaintiffs to show a discriminatory motive or intent. This means that 
the relevant actor must “intend the consequences of an act, not 
simply the act itself.”127 Simply put, evidence that an actor may have 
an implicit bias is not probative of whether the actor intended the 
consequences when implicit bias “operates automatically . . . beyond 
conscious awareness or intentional control.”128  
With that said, it is difficult to see how research into implicit bias 
and similar concepts can be used in the evidentiary process in dispar-
ate treatment cases.129 While stray remarks may be probative of the 
existence of an implicit bias, an implicit bias is, at best, only slightly 
probative of a discriminatory employment decision.130 This very low 
probative value comes also with serious concerns about false positives 
and questions about what is actually being measured by things like 
the IAT. With some doubts regarding the actual meaning of implicit 
bias and its measurements and the fact that implicit bias does not 
suggest a discriminatory intent or motive on the part of the actor, the 
social science critique fails to truly undermine the doctrine and its use 
by courts. This is not to say that the current state of employment  
126. Bodensteiner, supra note 13, at 100 (quoting Linda Hamilton Krieger, 
The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrim-
ination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161, 
1188 (1995)). 
127. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (2011) (quoting 
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (noting that Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 is similar to Title VII because both 
use the language “motivating factor” and that general tort law guides 
the interpretation of those words).  
128. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 112, at 1035.  
129. At least one court opinion has referenced implicit bias in its analysis of 
evidence of discrimination in a disparate treatment case. Kimble v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 775–78 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
This discussion, however, was in dicta. Id. (analyzing stereotypes and 
implicit bias but acknowledging that the “rejection of defendants’ 
explanation is a sufficient basis for finding liability”). 
130. Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconciling Impli-
cit Bias and Title VII, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 127, 143 (2013) (“Evalua-
tions of the IAT data demonstrate a low correlation to actual prejudicial 
behavior. Therefore, many of those who demonstrate an implicit bias 
. . . may never manifest any discriminatory behaviors.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 112, at 1100 (“[T]he fact that IAT 
scores have low positive correlations with behavior expansively defined 
as discriminatory guarantees that many individuals labeled prejudice by 
the IAT will not exhibit the behavior in question.”). 
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discrimination law is perfect or even adequate in light of an evolving 
understanding of how discrimination actually works. Such research 
may, within time, demand a change to our laws so as to reach the 
goals of Title VII and similar statutes. Until then, however, the Stray 
Remarks Doctrine remains proper. 
B.  The Role of the Judge 
Perhaps a more sound criticism of the Stray Remarks Doctrine is 
that judges may be using the doctrine to improperly exclude or 
dismiss evidence, particularly at the summary-judgment stage of 
litigation. Many argue that “[i]t should be up to the jury, as the fact 
finder, to weigh all of the evidence and decide whether workplace 
remarks [are] ‘too vague, too distant, or counterbalanced by other 
evidence to support a claim of discrimination.’”131  Further, critics 
allege that judges are improperly drawing inferences in favor of defen-
dants, weighing evidence and making credibility determinations of 
witnesses. 132  Undeniably there are cases in which these errors do 
occur.133 These mistakes are not exclusive to disparate treatment cases 
involving discriminatory remarks. These criticisms do, however, aid in 
understanding the basis for the Stray Remarks Doctrine and why it 
has developed. In analyzing these criticisms, it is important to 
distinguish between questions of admissibility and questions of suffic-
iency, a line that has often been blurred both in the application of the 
doctrine and in its criticism. Upon such an analysis, we find that the 
doctrine is justified in general by the rules regarding admissibility and 
sufficiency. 
1.  Determining Sufficiency 
The Stray Remarks Doctrine typically has its greatest effect 
during motions for summary judgment. Perhaps the most common 
wording of the doctrine is that when a remark involves the factors 
addressed above, evidence of the remark is insufficient to defeat 
summary judgment.134 Courts are frequently ruling in favor of an 
employer because the evidence of the remark is “too weak to raise a  
131. Reinsmith, supra note 6, at 255.  
132. Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The 
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 
34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 229 (1993). 
133. See, e.g., Russell v. McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 229–30 
(5th Cir. 2000) (reversing the lower court’s decision to dismiss a case in 
which it gave little weight to evidence that an employee who was the 
son of the CEO frequently referred to plaintiff as an “old bitch”). 
134. See, e.g., Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (“Comments that do not meet these criteria are considered 
‘stray remarks,’ and standing alone, are insufficient to defeat summary 
judgment.” (footnote omitted)). 
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genuine fact issue.”135 The dismissal of hundreds of cases on summary 
judgment has, of course, come with its fair share of criticism: 
Many of the opinions decided by different panels within the 
same circuit appear to conflict with one another. Some panels 
approach summary judgment cautiously; others do not. Many 
recent decisions wrongly interpret the trilogy [(Anderson, 
Celotex, and Matsushita)] to permit courts to draw inferences in 
defendants’ favor, to weigh evidence, to decide the credibility of 
witnesses and to require plaintiffs to prove their cases at the 
summary judgment stage. Many courts compound these errors 
by examining plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence in a piecemeal 
fashion.136 
Even some courts have been critical of the use of summary judgment 
where allegedly discriminatory remarks are present, since “[w]hether a 
given remark is ‘ambiguous’—whether it connotes discriminatory 
animus or it does not—is precisely what a jury should resolve, 
considering all of the facts in context. What may be ambiguous 
to . . . the judge, may not be to the plaintiff or to her peers.”137 
These misapplications of summary judgment, however, are not unique 
to disparate treatment cases involving stray remarks, and many 
courts have not committed these mistakes.  
In a motion for summary judgment, the question for the judge is 
whether the admissible evidence on record is sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. 138  This determination is solely a 
question of law.139 It is true that judges are not to substitute their 
own judgment for that of the jury and should avoid making credibil-
ity determinations or making inferences in favor of the movant.140 
 
135. E.g., Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1268 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (stating that a remark by a non-decision-maker of “Cubans 
are dumb” was “too weak to raise a genuine fact issue”).  
136. McGinley, supra note 132, at 228–29 (footnotes omitted).  
137. Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 335 (D. Mass. 
2011). 
138. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
139. Newsome v. Collin Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 189 F. App’x 353, 355 (5th 
Cir. 2006); Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1300–01 (5th Cir. 1994); 
In re Letterman Bros. Energy Sec. Litig., 799 F.2d 967, 972 (5th Cir. 
1986).  
140. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150–51 (2000); 
see also Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554–55 (1990) 
(stating that the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the non-movant and may not make credibility determinations or weigh 
the evidence); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
(stating that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, 
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This does not preclude judges from recognizing when a nonmovant 
has failed to meet their burden of production.141 A court must grant 
summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.”142 Whether in a prima facie or pretext analysis, a plaintiff must 
show that discrimination motivated an adverse employment action. If 
the only evidence is a discriminatory remark made by a coworker, and 
there is no evidence the decision maker heard or was influenced by 
the remark, then there are certainly genuine issues of which plaintiff 
has failed to raise any evidence.143 Certainly a reasonable jury could 
not conclude that the decision maker was motivated by any discrimi-
natory animus. 
Even where a decision maker makes a discriminatory remark, it is 
easy to understand why summary judgment may nonetheless be 
appropriate in certain situations. “The critical inquiry, the one 
commanded by the words of § 703(a)(1), is whether [the prohibited 
factor] was a factor in the employment decision at the moment it was 
made.”144 Arguably, the fact that a discriminatory remark was once 
made is slightly probative of a discriminatory motive in a later action, 
although this runs into the character evidence issues discussed below. 
Comments like these run into problems of whether they raise a 
genuine issue, however.  
Remarks that raise only a weak inference or are only slightly 
probative tend to be disregarded by courts, quite properly. “If the 
evidence is merely colorable, or not significantly probative, summary 
judgment may be granted.”145 More specifically, “[e]ven in cases where  
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury 
functions”). 
141. See 1 Clifford S. Fishman, Jones on Evidence § 3:39 (7th ed. 
1992).  
142. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  
143. See, e.g., Bonefont-Igaravidez v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120, 125 
(1st Cir. 2011) (“[Plaintiff] presents no evidence that [Defendant’s] 
decisionmakers made, or were even aware of, such comments at the time 
the decision to terminate was rendered. Nor is there evidence that [the 
Decisionmaker], in making her decision, relied on information from any 
[Defendant] employee who may have demonstrably possessed a 
discriminatory animus.”). 
144. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).  
145. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted); see also Sala v. Gates 
Constr. Corp., 868 F. Supp. 474, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“No genuine 
issue exists unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving 
party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is 
merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment 
may be granted.”); Matthews v. United States, 756 F. Supp. 511, 512 
(D. Kan. 1991) (“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is 
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elusive concepts such as motive or intent are at issue, summary 
judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely 
upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported 
speculation.”146 For example, in Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic Developers, 
Inc.,147 the Eleventh Circuit described evidence that the president and 
general counsel of an employer said “Cubans are dumb” as “too weak 
to raise a genuine fact issue,” even when combined with the plaintiff’s 
observation that “Cubans ‘seem to get terminated at a very high rate 
without justification.’”148 The remark, made by a non-decision-maker 
and unrelated to the decision, certainly does seem to be inadequate 
evidence that the decision itself was motivated by race-based animus. 
Similarly, in Agoh v. Hyatt Corp.,149 the Southern District of Texas 
held that multiple remarks were insufficient to defeat an employer’s 
motion for summary judgment in a Title VII and ADEA suit.150 The 
plaintiff alleged, among other comments, that two superiors, at dif-
ferent times, commented to him that he should retire so younger em-
ployees could be hired. While also dismissing other remarks, the court 
held that these remarks “hardly constitute[] sufficient evidence on 
which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff; instead [the 
remarks] seem[] to be a mere scintilla of evidence, not significantly 
probative of age discrimination.”151 
Of course, the sufficiency question can come out the other way. In 
Minshall v. McGraw Hill Broadcasting Co.,152 a news director at a 
broadcasting station made a number of age-related comments, 
including calling one employee “‘too fucking old’ for the news format” 
and saying that “old people should die” in reference to an employee’s 
father.153 While acknowledging that isolated and unrelated comments 
are “insufficient to show discriminatory animus in termination decis-
ions,” the court noted that “a plaintiff can show such animus by 
‘demonstrating a nexus between the allegedly discriminatory state-
 
significantly probative or more than merely colorable.”); Hermes v. Fed. 
Crop Ins. Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1292, 1293 (D. Kan. 1990) (“An issue of 
fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is significantly probative or more than 
merely colorable.”). 
146. Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
147. 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010). 
148. Id. at 1268 (emphasis added).  
149. 992 F. Supp. 2d 722 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 750 (emphasis added). 
152. 323 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2003). 
153. Id. at 1281. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? 
852 
ments and the defendant’s decision to terminate the plaintiff.’”154 The 
Tenth Circuit distinguished between these comments, holding that 
the comment about being too old for the news format did have a 
nexus to the decision not to renew the plaintiff’s contract, while the 
comment “old people should die,” in reference to the employee’s 
father, was a stray comment that had no connection to the decision 
not to renew the contract.155 The comments with a nexus were thus 
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, but the First 
Circuit has stated that a “lack of a direct connection between the 
words and the employment action significantly weakens their proba-
tive value.”156 
The sufficiency of stray remarks as evidence has been and likely 
will continue to be the main impact of the Stray Remarks Doctrine. 
While there are certainly instances in which courts are misapplying 
summary-judgment standards, they do retain the ability to grant 
summary judgment even where a discriminatory remark was made if 
that remark does not raise a genuine issue of material fact. Where a 
remark holds only limited probative value, insufficient for a reason-
able jury to find for the plaintiff, or where there is a lack of a nexus 
between the remarks and the employment action, courts may properly 
grant summary judgment. In order to avoid furthering the confusion 
and contradiction found in case law on the matter, courts should be 
sure to clearly elaborate why the evidence of a remark is insufficient. 
Additionally, courts should be sure to avoid analyzing different pieces 
of evidence individually in determining sufficiency, as they may 
buttress one another to make what may have been an unreasonable 
inference a more plausible inference.157 As stated in Reeves v. Sander-
son Plumbing Prods., Inc.,158 whether judgment as a matter of law is 
appropriate depends on “the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation 
is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and 
that properly may be considered.”159 
 
154. Id. (quoting Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1457 (10th 
Cir. 1994)). 
155. Id. at 1282. 
156. Rivera–Aponte v. Rest. Metropol #3, Inc., 338 F.3d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
157. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 
1998).  
158. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). 
159. Id. at 148–50.  
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2.  Determining Admissibility 
Courts are also often confronted with the question of whether 
certain evidence, such as an allegedly discriminatory remark, is 
admissible. While the application of the Stray Remarks Doctrine has 
its greatest impact in the summary-judgment phase, stray remarks 
also have made their mark in motions in limine. 160  Questions of 
admissibility go beyond motions in limine and trials, of course, as 
“[t]he principles governing admissibility of evidence do not change on 
a motion for summary judgment.”161 Judges must consider the admiss-
ibility of evidence submitted in opposition to (or support of) a motion 
for summary judgment.162 Where a stray remark is inadmissible under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, that remark should not be considered.  
a.  Questions of Relevancy 
Remarks may be inadmissible for any number of reasons. They 
may be irrelevant and thus not admissible under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 402.163 It is certainly difficult to argue that a discriminatory 
remark does not have a tendency to make a discriminatory motive 
more probable than without evidence of the remark.164 It must be kept 
in mind, however, that “[t]he relevance of discrimination-related 
remarks does not depend on their offensiveness, but rather on their 
tendency to show that the decision-maker was motivated by 
assumptions or attitudes relating to the protected class.”165 Further, 
as at least two decisions have noted, there is a point at which a prior 
act becomes so temporally remote that it cannot, as a matter of law, 
be relevant to the question of whether there was a discriminatory 
 
160. E.g., Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., No. 94CIV.7985(KTD)(JCF), 1997 WL 
634514, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 1997). 
161. Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 1997); see also Beyene v. 
Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is 
well settled that only admissible evidence may be considered by the trial 
court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.”); Lavespere v. 
Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 175–76 (5th Cir. 
1990) (“[T]he admissibility of evidence on a motion for summary 
judgment is subject to the same rules that govern the admissibility of 
evidence at trial.”). 
162. Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[E]vidence 
submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be 
admissible.” (quoting U.S. Structures, Inc. v. J.P. Structures, Inc., 
130 F.3d 1185, 1189 (6th Cir. 1997))).  
163. Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.”).  
164. Fed. R. Evid. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to 
make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”).  
165. Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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motive.166 While this may mean some discriminatory remarks are not 
relevant, it is unlikely that Rule 402 is a common reason for ruling 
remarks inadmissible.  
b.  Balancing Probative Value with the Rule 403 Concerns 
More commonly courts look to Rule 403167 to exclude evidence of 
discriminatory remarks. Rule 403 states that “[t]he court may exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing 
the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”168 Courts frequently cast 
discriminatory remarks in terms of their probativeness, characterizing 
remarks that fit the factors discussed above as having their probative 
value circumscribed, 169  or having significantly weakened probative 
value.170 At least three circuits have specifically looked at the balance 
between probativeness and prejudice in relation to stray remarks.171 
Naturally, these descriptions have not been universally approved, with 
some courts expressing their concern over courts that view the Stray 
Remarks Doctrine “not [as] a rule for analyzing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, but rather a rule to determine its very admissibility at trial 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.”172 While such a concern might 
be overstated since courts should be looking at the admissibility of all 
evidence, there is the underlying concern that Rule 403 is “a standard 
 
166. Hill v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 09-5463, 2012 WL 646002, at *2 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 28, 2012); Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 
515, 524 (3d Cir. 2003).  
167. Fed. R. Evid. 403.  
168. Id.  
169. E.g., Bonefont-Igaravidez v. Int’l Shipping Corp., 659 F.3d 120, 125 (1st 
Cir. 2011) (citing to McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998) in 
arguing that remarks made temporally remote, not made by a decision 
maker, or unrelated to the decision have their probativeness 
“circumscribed”).  
170. E.g., Ortiz-Rivera v. Astra Zeneca LP, 363 F. App’x 45, 47 (1st Cir. 
2010) (describing some stray remarks as “not significantly probative of 
pretext”). 
171. See, e.g., Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149–51 (2d Cir. 
2010); Morgan v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 425, 432–33 (6th Cir. 
2009); Joseph v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 151 F. App’x 760, 769 (11th 
Cir. 2005). 
172. Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 319, 334 (D. Mass. 
2011). 
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rather than a rule—and a standard that tilts in favor of admiss-
ibility.”173  
As has been discussed in the preceding section, many comments 
may lack significant probative value. To be inadmissible, the remark 
must first be analyzed for any probative value. Then that probative 
value, if any, must be weighed against any danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Some courts have 
found that the risk of unfair prejudice does exist in some circum-
stances. In Henry v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 174  the Second 
Circuit determined that the lower court could have been within the 
range of permissible decisions in excluding testimony pertaining to a 
coworker’s “tar baby” remark.175 The court concluded that the remark 
“had some, but not great, probative value” and that the remark 
“might have sufficiently offended members of the jury that they 
would feel inclined to rule against defendants, merely to punish [the 
employer] for continuing to employ [the coworker who uttered the 
remark].”176 Other courts have come to similar conclusions. In Mendel-
sohn v. Sprint/United Management Co.,177 the court held that even if 
some derogatory remarks had probative value, “the limited probative 
value was ‘substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, and by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.’”178 Similarly, in Knox v. First National Bank of Chicago,179 
the Northern District of Illinois held that alleged race-based com-
ments could not be used in testimony after noting that “Seventh Cir-
cuit authority suggests that the analysis is simply whether the proba-
tive value of the comment outweighs any possible unfair prejudice 
that the statement may cause.”180 
In Quinby v. WestLB AG, 181  an employer sought to preclude 
evidence of various e-mails and instant messages among her coworkers 
and clients containing potentially discriminatory jokes and comments. 
The suit was for disparate treatment and retaliation, thus 
 
173. Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 771 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
174. 616 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2010). 
175. Id. at 150. 
176. Id.  
177. 587 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 2008). 
178. Id. at 1219 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).  
179. 909 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
180. Id. at 574. Notably, the court seemed to misstate Rule 403, in that the 
unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative value. 
181. No. 04 Civ. 7406(WHP), 2007 WL 3047111 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2007).  
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complicating the analysis somewhat. Nonetheless, under Rule 403, the 
court found that those comments in the messages that directly 
concerned the plaintiff and her performance and those concerning the 
ability of women to perform their job duties were not excludable.182 At 
the same time, under Rules 401 and 403, the court excluded remarks, 
even those crude ones, that “do not relate to the ability of women to 
perform their job duties;” remarks relating to “boy’s club” social plans 
among her coworkers; remarks “reflecting negative but non-gendered 
comments about women in the office; and . . . items containing 
inappropriate comments about race or sexual orientation.”183 Although 
the court does not elaborate much, it seems to focus on the content 
and context factors found in the doctrine and excludes those 
distasteful comments that are not related to both the decision and 
prohibited factor because of the “dangers of unfair prejudice and 
confusion of the issues.”184 Exposing jurors to comments made among 
many of the coworkers that reflect bigotry but not necessarily a 
bigoted decision-making process would certainly risk a jury ruling 
against the employer simply because of the bigoted character of the 
other employees.185  
In Hill v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,186 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania excluded some comments be-
cause of unfair prejudice, while refraining from excluding others. The 
court did not exclude comments by a former coworker who may have 
had influence over the decision makers. This was despite the court’s 
noting that “an earlier discriminatory act might be remote enough 
that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
that it will cause unfair prejudice, meriting exclusion under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403.”187 The court turned around, however, and 
excluded under Rule 403 evidence that the relevant actor referred to 
another employee from the same protected class in a derogatory 
manner because the remark was made over a decade prior to the 
action, and thus the probative value was substantially outweighed by 
the danger that it would cause unfair prejudice.188 
 
182. Id. at *2. 
183. Id.  
184. Id.  
185. After all, “bigotry, per se, is not actionable. It is actionable only if it 
results in injury to a plaintiff; there must be a real link between the 
bigotry and an adverse employment action.” Gorence v. Eagle Food 
Ctrs., Inc., 242 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2001). 
186. No. 09-5463, 2012 WL 646002 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2012).  
187. Id. at *2 (citing Stair v. Lehigh Valley Carpenters Local Union No. 600, 
813 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
188. Id. at *3. 
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Discriminatory remarks have been regarded as holding little 
probative value while containing enough of a risk of unfair prejudice 
in different contexts and for different reasons. Although such exclus-
ions are generally discouraged at the pretrial stage to allow time for 
the potential relevance of the evidence to take shape, exclusion of 
evidence under Rule 403 is certainly permissible and provides a 
further explanation regarding why some stray remarks, although dis-
criminatory, are nonetheless not proper evidence. 
c.  Preventing Impermissible Character Evidence 
Another way in which a stray remark may be considered inad-
missible is if it constitutes impermissible character evidence. “Evi-
dence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible to 
prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character or trait.”189 This ban also applies to past bad 
acts.190 There is certainly an argument that evidence of past discrim-
inatory remarks unrelated to the decision are impermissible propens-
ity arguments that (1) decision maker made a bigoted statement; thus 
(2) decision maker is a bigot; thus (3) decision maker acted in 
conformity with that bigotry. Of course, Rule 404(b)(2) permits evi-
dence of another act to prove motive or intent,191 but it is difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which this does not require an initial inference 
that the unrelated discriminatory remark means the speaker is a 
bigot, thus making an impermissible propensity argument.192 Nonethe-
less, there have been few attempts to use Rule 404 to exclude 
evidence of discriminatory remarks, and most of them have been un-
successful. To the Author’s knowledge, no courts have, however, truly 
analyzed the propensity-based inference that seems to exist where a 
decision maker makes a remark that is unrelated to the decision. 
Instead, comments found to be inadmissible tend to be found so 
because of Rule 403, not 402 or 404. 
IV. So What Really Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? 
As has been shown, the Stray Remarks Doctrine is not a simple 
rule, if it can be called a rule at all. A range of factors are taken into 
consideration by courts, but the factors’ significance is not viewed 
with much consistency across different courts. The question of whe-
ther they are describing such remarks as insufficient to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact or finding them to be inadmissible under the  
189. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). 
190. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). 
191. See, e.g., Hill v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 09-5463, 2012 WL 646002, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2012). 
192. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013).  
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Federal Rules of Evidence is also a source of uncertainty. The lack of 
uniformity in the way stray remarks are handled leads to the question 
of whether the Stray Remarks Doctrine really is a doctrine at all.  
In Hunt v. City of Markham, Illinois,193 Judge Posner discussed 
cases dealing with the effect of stray remarks. In doing so, Judge 
Posner stated the following:  
All that these cases hold—all that they could hold and still 
make any sense—is that the fact that someone who is not 
involved in the employment decision of which the plaintiff 
complains expressed discriminatory feelings is not evidence that 
the decision had a discriminatory motivation. That is simple 
common sense.194 
Rather than serving as a rule or even a standard, the Stray Remarks 
Doctrine is but a name for the common characteristics that a 
multitude of courts have found tend to reduce the value of evidence of 
discriminatory remarks. Even this description is too simplistic, 
however.  
Beyond being a bad idea, making certain types of evidence 
categorically inadmissible or insufficient would likely run afoul of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and Supreme Court precedent on motions 
for summary judgment. This appears to be what some courts nonethe-
less do—possibly a result of much of the significant jurisprudence on 
the subject of disparate treatment evolving prior to either the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence or the series of rulings on 
summary judgment. McDonnell Douglas was decided two years before 
the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The “trilogy” of sum-
mary judgment cases,195 decided in 1986, came after important rulings 
such as McDonnell Douglas,196 Burdine,197 Furnco Construction,198 and 
Griggs. 199  Regardless, it is becoming increasingly clear that the 
existence of certain factors does not make stray remarks categorically 
excludable. Courts are beginning to recognize that “oversimplified 
generalization[s]” have been made in relation to stray remarks.200  
 
193. 219 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000). 
194. Id. at 652. 
195. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
196. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
197. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
198. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). 
199. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
200. Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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This marks a shift, and a quite proper one, in the analysis of 
discriminatory remarks. Instead of simply looking for the existence of 
the factors, courts are beginning to look more carefully at the remark 
itself and the surrounding circumstances. Courts are recognizing that 
two remarks, which may share common characteristics, may 
nonetheless hold widely different probative values because of the 
existence of other factors or considerations. Courts are moving away 
from simply categorizing remarks as stray or not and then disregard-
ing them if they are deemed stray.201 At the very least, courts are 
refocusing on why remarks that involve certain factors should be 
disregarded, because they fail to show that the decision itself was 
motivated by discrimination. 202  Instead, they are focusing on the 
overall value of remarks. While they are not always explicit about it, 
courts are viewing these remarks in terms of their probative value,203 
prejudice,204 and sufficiency.205 Thus, the Stray Remarks Doctrine is 
not the rule or even the doctrine it has been made out to be. In 
increasingly obvious fashion, it is just the application of already 
existing rules of evidence and procedure to a certain form of evidence 
often found in employment discrimination settings. 
From this perspective, the treatment of stray remarks becomes 
increasingly clear. The continuing confusion over mixed-motive 
analyses and direct-evidence requirements becomes much less prob-
lematic. The questions are, quite simply, whether, and to what degree, 
the remarks being analyzed are relevant to and probative of 
employment discrimination. In a motion for summary judgment, if 
those remarks are relevant and probative, is the probative value so  
201. See, e.g., id. at 116 (noting that such an approach is incorrect).  
202. See, e.g., Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(characterizing stray remarks as those unrelated to the decisional 
process); Threadgill v. Spellings, 377 F. Supp. 2d 158, 164 (D.C. 2005) 
(characterizing stray remarks as those made in isolated situations out of 
context of the decision); Del Franco v. N.Y.C. Off-Track Betting Corp., 
429 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring a nexus between 
remarks and the decision); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330 (4th Cir. 
2004) (stating that remarks must be related to the decision in order to 
be relevant).  
203. E.g., McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 
140 F.3d 288, 301 (1st Cir. 1998) (describing stray remarks as relevant 
but having limited probative value when certain factors exist). 
204. E.g., Joseph v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 151 F. App’x 760, 769 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (finding error in the lower court’s admission of evidence of 
racial slurs because it was “highly prejudicial”). 
205. E.g., Jackson v. Cal-W. Packaging Corp., 602 F.3d 374, 380–81 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (finding that a remark that was made nearly a year earlier 
and that came with no evidence that the remark was related to the 
employment action is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact).  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 3·2015 
What Is the Stray Remarks Doctrine? 
860 
minimal that no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff? In any 
other setting, as well as in a motion for summary judgment, is the 
probative value outweighed by concerns for unfair prejudice or 
confusing the issues? Are there any other admissibility concerns, such 
as the evidence requiring an impermissible character trait inference? 
The factors discussed in Part III.A are not dispositive considerations. 
They are, rather, a nonexhaustive list of factors, which, if present, 
should elicit concern from a judge regarding whether such evidence is 
sufficient or admissible. Whether a judge is considering one of those 
factors or any other potential factor, they must remain cognizant that 
the ultimate question is whether the decision was made with a 
discriminatory motive. 
With this clarity, the criticism and concerns over the Stray 
Remarks Doctrine become less of a problem. Criticism from a social 
science perspective misses the distinction between disparate treatment 
and disparate impact and fails to adequately show how measures of 
implicit bias or anything similar can evidence discriminatory motive 
in the relevant decision. Concerns that employment discrimination 
law is not reaching significant forms of discrimination is not a criti-
cism of the propriety of the handling of stray remarks by courts; 
rather, it is an argument critical of the nature of laws such as Title 
VII themselves. Negative commentary on the way judges have 
handled stray remarks under rules of evidence and procedure relates 
to mistakes not unique to stray remarks. Instead, these rules illustrate 
exactly why such remarks are often disregarded. 
Moving forward, it would be wise for courts to take notice of 
these criticisms so that, at the very least, understanding of the 
application of the rules will come with greater clarity and thus 
reduced concern over whether such remarks are being disregarded by 
courts for improper reasons. A more careful analysis of the probative 
values, the presence and interplay of other evidence, the potential for 
unfair prejudice or improper character trait inferences should also lead 
to a better understanding of what disparate treatment law really is 
meant to combat: decisions made with a discriminatory motive. This 
is all “simple common sense.”206 
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